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Incentives vs. Selection in Promotion Tournaments: 
Can a Designer Kill Two Birds with One Stone?
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This paper studies the performance of promotion tournaments with heterogeneous 
participants in two dimensions: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis 
reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two goals: While total effort is 
maximized if less heterogeneous participants compete against each other early in the 
tournament, letting more heterogeneous participants compete early increases the accuracy in 
selection. Experimental evidence supports our theoretical findings, indicating that the optimal 
design of promotion tournaments crucially depends on the objectives of the tournament 
designer. These findings have important implications for the optimal design of promotion 
tournaments in organizations. 
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Most employment relationships are characterized by competition among employees for promotion to a
higher level position. The prospect of moving up the ladder to a better paid, more attractive position
is a strong motivator for employees to exert eort on their current job. By creating incentives for
workers through deferred compensation that can be linked to performance, promotion tournaments are
a prominent instrument in the practice of human resource management. The central advantage of a
promotion tournament is the modest informational requirement (only ordinal knowledge of workers'
performance is necessary) and the fact that the employees' performance needs only to be observable
and not necessarily veriable by the employer (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981 and Prendergast,
1999). This gives tournaments a clear advantage over many other compensation schemes and pro-
vides an explanation for their widespread use, especially in higher ranks of rms and organizations,
which are typically characterized by multi-dimensional tasks, lack of cardinal information on individual
performance and non veriable information.
In addition to being a powerful incentive device, promotion tournaments can also perform a second
important function: sorting heterogeneous employees by ability. The selection properties of tourna-
ments are especially relevant in dynamic promotion tournaments with multiple stages. This has already
been stressed by Rosen in his seminal paper on promotion tournaments, stating that "the inherent logic
[of sequential elimination tournaments] is to determine the best contestants and to promote survival
of the ttest" (Rosen 1986, p.701). Despite its practical importance, little is known about the selec-
tion properties of tournaments with heterogeneous workers in theory, even though some recent papers
address this aspect.1
This paper addresses the central question that naturally arises once the tournament designer op-
timizes along two dimensions: Can promotion tournaments kill two birds with one stone? Or, put
dierently, is there a trade-o between incentive provision and selection performance? Answering this
question is of high practical relevance, as it as it helps tournament designers to nd the optimal struc-
ture of promotion tournaments given the relative weights assigned to each of the two goals. However,
the two central goals of promotion tournaments { providing employees with incentives to exert eort
and selection of the most able employees for higher-ranked positions { have typically been studied
independently from each other in the literature. This is rather surprising, since recent theoretical work
by Koch and Nafziger (2011) shows in a very general framework that it is not optimal for a company to
separate the two goals, and both dimensions are certainly of central interest to designers of promotion
1See, e.g., Clark and Riis (2001) or Ryvkin and Ortmann (2008).
1tournaments: First, heterogeneity between workers is obviously rather the rule than the exception in
real world promotion tournaments.2 Therefore, accuracy in selecting high ability employees for higher
levels in the hierarchy is clearly an important issue in any organization. Secondly, a large proportion
of observed wage variations within rms is associated with promotions, whereas the link between pay
variation within hierarchical levels and performance is rather weak.3 Instead, most of the literature
has concentrated on studying the properties of dierent tournament formats for eort provision, with
the typical result that heterogeneity in the workforce is detrimental for eort exertion.4 Part of the
literature has also been devoted to the investigation of how these detrimental eects of heterogeneity
on incentives can be moderated, for example by handicapping of strong workers (Lazear and Rosen,
1981) or by type dependent wages (G urtler and Kr akel, 2010).
This paper investigates the question of a trade-o between incentive provision and selection per-
formance in two steps. In the rst step, we theoretically investigate a promotion tournament with
heterogeneous workers. In this tournament, workers are perfectly informed about both their own abil-
ity and the ability of their co-workers { due to, e.g., repeated interactions in the work place. The
tournament designer in contrast possesses only some noisy prior knowledge about the ability of his
workers. We investigate whether the designer can use this prior knowledge to structure the tourna-
ment in a way as to achieve strong incentives for eort exertion as well as a high accuracy in selecting
the better workers. More specically, we ask whether the designer should structure the tournament
such that either relatively similar or relatively diverse workers compete against each other early in the
tournament.
The analysis of the model suggests the existence of a fundamental trade-o between incentive
provision and selection. While total eort is maximized by letting relatively similar workers compete
early in the tournament, accuracy in selection is maximized by letting relatively heterogeneous workers
compete early in the tournament. Intuitively, when relatively heterogeneous workers compete early,
weak workers are discouraged and as a response, strong workers slack-o as well, such that total eort
is reduced. On the other hand, letting diverse workers compete early is good for accuracy in selection,
because the weak employee's decrease in eort due to discouragement is more pronounced than that of
the strong due to slacking o. This increases the probability that weak employees drop out early, which
translates in an increased probability of promoting \the ttest". As a consequence, the optimality of
2For instance, O'Keee, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984, p.42) note that \Most contests in this world are among unequal
contestants".
3See Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), for example, as well as the literature cited in their paper.
4See Sunde (2009) for empirical evidence from heterogeneous tennis tournaments, and Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt
(1987) or Harbring and L unser (2008) for experimental evidence.
2the tournament design crucially depends on the relative weights that the principal attaches to these
goals.
As the second step, we present the results of experiments that were designed to test the behavioral
relevance of the fundamental trade-o between incentives and selection. We nd strong evidence that
the tournament design matters for relative performance in the two dimensions. More specically, we
nd that the tournament design has a strong eect on the accuracy of selection, and a minor eect
on incentive provision as long as heterogeneity is modest. Results of an alternative treatment where
the degree of heterogeneity between workers is higher delivers a more sizable eect on incentives in the
direction predicted by the theory. Put together, these results support the theoretical prediction that
a tournament designer faces a trade-o between incentive provision and selection if the tournament
participants are heterogeneous.
This paper contributes to dierent strands of the tournament literature. The paper related closest
to ours is the one by Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007) who study a one-stage CEO promotion
tournament with heterogenenous agents, assuming that both the quality of the promoted agent and the
provision of incentives matter for the designer. While they consider the same trade-o as we do, their
setting is quite dierent from the one we analyze: Their focus is on optimal handicapping in a contest
in which outsiders and insiders compete for a CEO position, assuming that only eort provision by
insiders matters on this stage of the competition, whereas the ability matters on a second stage when
they work as a CEO under a revenue sharing contract. In contrast, we analyze the optimal design of
a multi-stage tournament in the spirit of Rosen (1986) with heterogeneous agents, in which incentives
as well as selection performance at all stages of the tournament matter for the designer. Essentially,
our results show that the trade-o established by Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007) for a
competition between insiders and outsiders also holds for purely internal promotion tournaments if a
company employs workers of dierent types. That tournament design can involve a trade-o between
incentives and sorting accuracy has also been shown by Groh, Moldovanu, Sela, and Sunde (2011).
However, while they analyze the case of an all-pay-auction, our analysis complements theirs by focusing
on a standard Tullock contest framework. Moreover, we contribute to the relatively small literature
on the optimal design of multi-stage elimination tournaments. By considering heterogeneity between
participants, our analysis complements the study by Fu and Lu (2011), who determine the optimal
number of stages as well as the optimal allocation of prizes across stages when the designer's goal is
the maximization of aggregate eort and agents are homogeneous. Further, we extend the theoretical
work on behavior of heterogeneous agents in two-stage contests by Stein and Rapoport (2004) and
Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) by considering a situation in which continuation values in early stages of
3the tournament are endogenously determined, and the eort choice of agents is unrestricted. Finally,
our analysis complements experimental work of Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt (2004), Altmann, Falk,
and Wibral (2008), and Sheremeta (2010), who analyze dierent aspects of the optimal design of
tournaments, but who restrict attention to the case of homogeneous players.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
its implications. We test the theoretical predictions experimentally in section 3. Section 4 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 A Model of Promotion Tournaments With Heterogeneous Workers
We follow Rosen (1986) by modeling the promotion competition in a company as a multi-stage pairwise
elimination tournament. The simplest contest of this type with heterogeneous participants is the two-
stage pairwise elimination contest with four workers of two dierent types, who compete under a
Tullock contest success function with discriminatory power of 1. Hence, we consider a setting with
two hierarchical levels and four workers of two possible types. The workers compete pairwise and the
winning probability of each worker is proportional to the relative eort he provides. An advantage of
this highly stylized and simplied model is that it remains analytically tractable. As will become clear
later in the discussion of the results, however, our model provides important insights that are robust
to changes in the simplifying assumptions we make.
In such a two-stage pairwise elimination tournament, there are three two-person interactions to
consider: Two parallel interactions on the rst stage, and one interaction on the nal stage among
those workers who were promoted from stage 1. Under the assumption that equal shares of the workers
in the tournament are \weak" (type W) and \strong" (type S), two dierent settings are possible: The
principal can separate strong and weak workers in the rst stage, i.e., the two strong and the two weak
employees compete against each other in the two parallel interactions (setting A: SSWW); alternatively,
the stage 1 interactions can be mixed, i.e., each strong worker competes with a weak one on stage 1
(setting B: SWSW).
Heterogeneity between workers is modeled by assuming type-dependent linear cost of eort. Specif-
ically, the eort cost of strong workers, cS, is assumed to be lower than the eort cost cW of weak
workers (cS  cW). It is assumed throughout that all workers are perfectly informed about both their
own type and the type of their colleagues. Modeling heterogeneity in terms of eort cost is without loss
4of generality. The theoretical results presented below hold also if heterogeneity is modeled in terms of
diering ability or valuation of the prize.5
To induce eort provision by workers, being promoted must have some value. In our simplied
model, there are three events of promotion: First, two workers are promoted from stage 1 to stage 2,
one from each pairwise interaction. Then, on stage 2, one of these two workers is promoted to the top
level position. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the promotion to the top level position
entails an exogenously given wage increase P, whereas there is no immediate reward for a promotion
from stage 1 to stage 2.
Due to the strictly positive value of promotion to the top level position, workers have an incentive
to exert eort on each stage of the tournament because eort provision increases the probability to
receive the prize P. In their eort decision, workers face a trade-o between higher costs and a higher
promotion probability associated with an increase in own eort. In equilibrium, workers choose eort
in such a way that the marginal cost of eort provision ck 2 fcW;cSg equals the expected marginal
monetary gain of promotion to the top level position. If two workers i and j, with j 6= i, compete
against each other on a given stage of the tournament, and if the eort of worker k 2 fi;jg is xk(ck),





This formulation of the winning probability is standard in the literature and implies that the winning
probability of a worker i is increasing in the eort he provides, and decreasing in the eort of his
opponent j.
Below, we will rst derive the analytical solution for both settings, A: SSWW and B: SWSW, in section
2.2. In section 2.3 we analyze the equilibrium properties of both settings in terms of selection per-
formance and aggregate eort provided. Finally, we discuss the implications of these ndings on the
optimal tournament design in section 2.4 and address the role of the simplifying assumptions for our
results.
2.2 Equilibrium Behavior
The solution concept for a two-stage tournament is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Solving the game
via backwards induction, we start by analyzing all possible interactions of stage 2, and subsequently
solve stage 1, taking the optimal actions in stage 2 as given. Recall that the only reward for winning
5Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
5stage 1 is the participation in stage 2, which provides the possibility of an eventual promotion to the
top position with the associated prize P. The expected equilibrium payos for both types and all
potential stage 2 interactions thus determine the continuation values and the optimal eorts on stage
1.
2.2.1 Solution for Stage 2
With four players of two types, there are three potential stage 2 games, namely (1) SS, (2) WW, or (3)
SW, each of which is considered below. Independent of the specic interaction, xi2(ci) denotes the eort
of agent i with eort cost ci on stage 2. Equilibrium eorts are marked with an asterisk.
(1) SS: If two strong agents l and k of type S compete with each other on stage 2, they both face
the same maximization problem. Without loss of generality, we consider the optimization by agent














4cS. Inserting optimal actions in the objective function gives the payo that a







(2) WW: The symmetry argument with respect to the maximization problem also holds if two weak
agents l and k of type W compete with each other on stage 2. As before, we consider the optimization
by player l without loss of generality: maxxl20 Wl(WW) =
xl2
xl2+xk2P   cWxl2. The same steps as before
deliver equilibrium eorts x
l2 = x
k2 = P
4cW. When inserting these eorts in the objective function above,







(3) SW: Finally, consider the situation where a strong agent S meets a weak agent W on stage 2. The
6Note that the expected payo is the same for player l and player k, therefore the indices can be dropped.












P   cWxw2 :
The combination of rst-order conditions implies equilibrium eorts x
S2 = cW
(cS+cW)2P for the strong agent
and x
W2 = cS
(cS+cW)2P for the weak agent, respectively. Inserting optimal actions in the two objective












(cS + cW)2P : (4)
2.2.2 Solution for Stage 1
With all potential stage 2 interactions solved, we proceed to compute the equilibrium on stage 1 for
the two specications A: SSWW (homogeneous stage 1 interactions), and B: SWSW (heterogeneous stage 1
interactions). We begin with setting A: SSWW. The eort of agent i (i = 1;2;3;4) on stage 1 in setting
n (n = A;B) is denoted by xn
i1; as before, equilibrium eorts are marked with an asterisk.
Setting A: SSWW Two-stage tournaments with this structure have been analyzed in the previous
literature.7 In this setting, one strong and one weak worker reach stage 2 with certainty and conse-
quently, SW is the only possible constellation on stage 2. This implies that both strong workers know
that conditional on reaching stage 2, a weak worker will be the opponent, while weak workers know
that they will interact with a strong one in case they get promoted to stage 2.8 We assume without
loss of generality that workers 1 and 2 are strong, while workers 3 and 4 are weak. The value of
participation on stage 2 is given by (3) for workers 1 and 2, while the continuation value for workers 3
and 4 is dened by (4). Note that due to symmetry of the optimization problems, it suces to solve
the optimization problem of one strong worker (1 or 2) and one weak worker (3 or 4). Without loss of
7This situation corresponds to what Stein and Rapoport (2004) refer to as \seminals" model in their paper.
8Strong agents do not care which of the two weak agents they meet on stage 2, since any agent of type W chooses the
same equilibrium strategy. An analogous argument holds for weak agents.

















































4cW(cS + cW)2P: : (6)
Setting B: SWSW In setting B: SWSW, optimal behavior is somewhat harder to characterize because
the continuation values are more complicated as there is a mutual interdependence of the workers'
continuation values. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, a closed-form solution for this setting in
the context of a Tullock contest success function has not been presented in the literature.9 As will
become clear below, continuation values are endogenously determined in this setting, which complicates
the solution. Nevertheless, properties of this setting were previously discussed by Rosen (1986) who
conjectured (without analytical proof) that certain properties of numerical simulations hold in general.
As for setting A: SSWW, we again dene that workers 1 and 2 are strong, whereas workers 3 and
4 are weak. Further, we assume that workers 1 and 3 as well as workers 2 and 4 interact on stage
1, i.e., each strong worker meets a weak one, and vice versa. Note that the two stage 1 interactions
are identical, i.e., it suces to analyze one of the two.10 Without loss of generality, we consider the









































































41) denote the continuation values for workers 1 and 3, respectively,
9The only paper that deals with endogenously determined continuation values is Groh, Moldovanu, Sela, and Sunde
(2011), but they consider the limit case of an all-pay auction, i.e., in the case in which the contest-success function is
perfectly discriminating.
10The unique equilibrium in pure strategies exists regardless of the degree of heterogeneity. A proof is available upon
request.
8which depend on the behavior of workers 2 and 4 in the other stage 1 interaction, i.e., the continuation
values are endogenously determined. The reason for this complication is that the tournament structure
allows for three dierent stage 2 interactions, namely SS, WW, and SW, which are of dierent value to
agents of the two types and which occur with dierent probabilities.

















2 = 0 :
If we combine these conditions, we obtain another necessary equilibrium condition which denes a























21 + (cS + cW)2xB
41
: (7)






















21 + (cS + cW)2xB
41



































































The above expression allows for an analytical solution of the game. Essentially, F (cS;cW) is a measure
for the additional heterogeneity between strong and weak agents on stage 1 that is due to dierences
in continuation values.11 Thus, the two interdependent stage 1 interactions can be disentangled in
11The continuation value for strong agents is always higher than the continuation value for weak agents, as shown by
the rst-order conditions above.










(cS + cW)2F (cW;cS) + 4c2
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(cS + cW)2 + 4c2
SF (cW;cS)
4(cS + cW)2[1 + F (cS;cW)]
P ;
since, due to symmetry, P1(xB
21 ;xB
41 ) = P2(xB
11 ;xB
31 ) and P3(xB
21 ;xB
41 ) = P4(xB
11 ;xB
31 ). Given these






(cS + cW)2F (cW;cS)2 + 4c2
WF (cW;cS)






(cS + cW)2F (cW;cS) + 4c2
SF (cW;cS)2
4cW(cS + cW)2[1 + F (cS;cW)]3 P : (10)
2.3 Properties of the Equilibrium Solutions
Based on the closed form solutions derived previously we proceed by analyzing the properties of the
equilibrium. To investigate the properties in the two dimensions of interest, incentives and selection,
we dene performance measures to capture them.
Incentives: In the existing literature, elimination tournaments have been analyzed mostly as a means
to provide participants with incentives for eort provision, following the approach taken in the seminal
paper by Lazear and Rosen (1981). In this literature, it is common to use total expected equilibrium
eort, i.e., the sum of equilibrium eorts on stage 1 and (expected) equilibrium eorts on stage 2, as a
measure for the provision of incentives. The underlying idea of this approach is that eort provision by
workers and productivity are directly linked, i.e., total output is an increasing function of total eort.
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume that eort translates one to one into output,
such that total output equals the amount of eort provided in both stages of the tournament.12 This
implies that we do not need to distinguish between total output and total eort. For the remainder of
this paper, we concentrate on total eort provided by the workers.














The characterization of the corresponding measure for setting B: SWSW is more involved since three
12This assumption is without loss of generality as long as output is a weakly increasing function of eort.
10dierent interactions can occur on stage 2, each with some probability. Therefore, ESWSW represents an
expected value, which has a variance from an ex-ante perspective. Realized ex-post equilibrium eort
provision varies and depends on the type composition of the stage 2 interaction; it is highest in case of
the interaction SS which is observed with probability [F (cS;cW)]2=[1 + F (cS;cW)]2, lowest in situation
WW which realizes with probability 1=(1 + F (cS;cW))2, and intermediate in pairing SW, which occurs
with probability 2F (cS;cW)=[1+F (cS;cW)]2. This is dierent in setting A: SSWW, where the interaction
SW is always observed with certainty on stage 2.
The computation of the eort measure yields
ESWSW =
(cS + cW)2F (cW;cS)2 + 4c2
WF (cW;cS)




(cS + cW)2[cS + cWF (cS;cW)2] + 4cScWF (cS;cW)




A comparison of ESSWW, and ESWSW gives the following relation between the two settings in terms of total
eort:
Proposition 1 (Incentive Provision). When the cost of eort is strictly higher for weak than for
strong agents (cW > cS), total eort is always strictly higher in setting A: SSWW than in setting B: SWSW;
formally, this implies that ESSWW > ESWSW for all cW > cW.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that heterogeneity between workers has dierent eects on eort provision
in setting A: SSWW than B: SWSW. We know from previous work on tournaments with heterogeneous
workers that two eects are responsible for the detrimental eect of heterogeneity on eort provision:
On the one hand, weak workers reduce their eort (compared to a situation with lower costs) because
it is more costly for them. On the other hand, strong workers optimally react to the eort reduction of
their competitor by also reducing their equilibrium eort. Intuitively, the distortion that weak workers
invest less eort in the tournament is less pronounced in setting A: SSWW, where weak workers compete
among themselves on stage 1 and do not have to interact with strong ones. In contrast, weak workers
meet a strong worker for sure on stage 1 of setting B: SWSW, and with a high probability also on stage
2 (if they reach stage 2). Consequently, they reduce their eort provision even more. The advantage
of setting A: SSWW over B: SWSW in terms of eort provision is further accentuated by the reaction of
strong workers to heterogeneity.
Figure 1 plots total expected eort for the two settings as a function of heterogeneity, reected by
the constant marginal cost by the weak agent, cW, while the costs for the strong agent and the prize
11Figure 1: Incentive Provision
Notes: The gure plots expressions (11) and (12) with cS = 1 and P = 1.
for being promoted to the top level position are normalized to 1 (cS = 1 and P = 1). The gure
illustrates that the dierence between the two settings is most pronounced for intermediate degrees of
heterogeneity, since total eort provision in both settings converges towards that of a tournament with
strong workers only, ESSSS = 3
4cSP, if cW ! cS, while this measure approaches P
2cS if cW ! 1. However,
even in situations with very low or very high degree of heterogeneity in which the dierence in total
eort exerted is rather small in equilibrium, the dierence becomes increasingly relevant if one allows
for multiple prizes, with a high prize for the winner of stage 2, and another, lower prize for the loser
of the interaction on stage 2.13 Such a prize structure is likely to be common practice rather than
an exception in reality. If part of the prize P is moved to the earlier stages, total eort provision
decreases in both specications, but especially so in setting B: SWSW, where the stage 1 interactions
are heterogeneous. Contrary, both stage 1 interactions are homogeneous in setting A: SSWW, such that
the dierence in total eort provision between the two settings increases. In this sense, the baseline
specication of the theoretical investigation is likely to underestimate the dierence between settings
A: SSWW and B: SWSW in terms of eort provision.
Selection: There is no unambiguous way to measure the selection accuracy of a tournament. In the
context of promotion tournaments, it appears natural to assume that it is in the principal's interest
to promote strong (type S) rather than weak workers (type W) to the top level position. However,
it is rather dicult to generally justify the relative importance of promotion on the two stages. As
will become clear below, this does not constitute a problem for current application, because one of
13The solution presented above can be directly extended to the consideration multiple prizes. Formal proofs for the
verbal arguments are available from the authors upon request.
12Figure 2: Selection
Notes: The gure plots expressions (13) and (14) with cS = 1.
the two settings has a higher selection performance on both stages. Therefore, we dene the selection
performance of a tournament as the probability that one of the two strong workers is promoted to the
top level position. We refer to this selection measure as S.14 The respective selection measures SSSWW






(cS + cW)F (cS;cW)2 + 2cWF (cW)
(cS + cW)[1 + F (cS;cW)]2 : (14)
In setting A: SSWW, the selection performance is necessarily determined on stage 2. The measure SSSWW is
therefore equal to the ratio of stage 2 eorts provided by strong and weak workers. Relative incentives
for strong and weak workers also determine the selection performance in setting B: SWSW. However, in
this setting selection occurs on both stages of the tournament. As with the incentive measure E, we
compare settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW in terms of their selection performance and get to the following
result:
Proposition 2 (Selection performance). When the cost of eort is strictly higher for weak than for
strong agents (cW > cS), the ex-ante probability that a strong agent wins the tournament is always higher
in setting B: SWSW than in setting A: SSWW; formally, this implies that SSSWW < SSWSW for all cW > cS.
Proof. See Appendix.
The nding that setting B: SWSW performs better than setting A: SSWW in terms of promoting a
strong worker to the top level position is due to the dierences in selection on stage 1. While there
14This would be a natural candidate for selection also in other applications, like procurement tournaments, or sports.
13is selection on both stages of the tournament in setting B: SWSW, a weak agent reaches stage 2 with
certainty in setting A: SSWW. Consequently, stage 1 does not contribute to the selection in setting A:
SSWW, which implies a lower selection accuracy overall. This fact also explains why relative importance
of promotions on stages 1 and 2 does not aect the results: Both, the probability to promote strong
workers from stage 1 to stage 2, and the probability to promote a strong worker from stage 2 to the top
level position, are higher in setting B: SWSW than in A: SSWW. Figure 2 displays the relation in terms of
selection performance between settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW graphically: The Figure shows that the
probability that a worker of type S is promoted to the top level position is close to 50% in both settings
if strong and weak workers are almost identical (cW ! cS = 1). However, as heterogeneity between
worker types increases, the probability that a strong worker is promoted to the top level approaches 1
rather fast in setting B: SWSW compared to setting A: SSWW, where the probability becomes high only
for extreme degrees of heterogeneity.
2.4 Implications for the Optimal Design
Under the assumption that the selection performance and the incentives for eort provision are impor-
tant for the tournament designing principal, one can describe the preferences of the principal by use of
an objective function Z(E;S), where Z(E;S) is increasing in both arguments, in the total eort E and
the selection performance S. As Propositions 1 and 2 show, there is no clear solution to this problem:
Whether the principal prefers a situation in which he pairs workers of equal types on stage 1 (A: SSWW)
over or setting where stage 1 interactions are mixed (B: SWSW), depends on the relative weights that the
principal attaches to eort provision by the agents and to selection performance. In other words, the
two goals are conicting, such that the designer has to trade-o gains in one dimension against losses in
the other. The intuition for the existence of this trade-o becomes clear when distinguishing absolute
and relative incentives for eort provision. Selection performance is driven by the ratio of the workers'
eorts: The higher the incentives for strong workers to provide eort are relative to the incentives for
weak workers, the better is the performance of a tournament in the selection dimension. This implies
that a high degree of heterogeneity between workers is benecial, because the heterogeneity discour-
ages weak workers more than it induces strong workers to slack o, which facilitates selection. At the
same time, however, heterogeneity reduces incentives for eort provision, a measure which depends on
absolute incentives. In this dimension, the performance of a tournament is better the higher incentives
for eort provision are for both strong and weak workers in absolute terms.
This trade-o between absolute and relative incentives for eort provision is a result that holds in
14general. Essentially, implementing design A: SSWW can be understood as an indirect way of handicapping
strong workers. In this setting, being promoted to stage 2 is harder for strong workers than in setting
B: SWSW. Therefore, it is generally the case that actions which increase the incentives for eort provision
in heterogeneous settings, like handicapping  a la Lazear and Rosen (1981), or wage discrimination  a
la G urtler and Kr akel (2010), or seeding of worker types as in this paper, automatically reduce the
selection performance of a tournament. This result holds regardless of the tournament design and the
number of worker types.
3 Experimental Evidence
3.1 Implementation
The experiment implements the exact same tournament structure that was analyzed theoretically in
the previous section. Four subjects competed in a two-stage elimination tournament for a unique prize
P of 240 Taler (the currency of the experiment), which the winner of the stage 2 interaction received;
200 Taler equal 1.00 Euro. The prize had the same value for all participants. Following the theoretical
model, we introduce heterogenenity between agents through dierent costs of eort provision: strong
agents had a cost of eort equal to cS = 1:00 Taler in all treatments, while weak agents had costs of
cW = 1:50 Taler. Eort provision was implemented in terms of investments in a lottery: Participants
were told that they could buy a discrete number of balls in the stage 1 interaction.15 The balls purchased
by the subjects as well as those purchased by their respective opponents in the stage 1 interaction were
then said to be placed in the same urn, of which one ball was randomly drawn. The agent who
purchased this ball proceeded to the stage 2 interaction. This setting closely reects the theoretical
counterpart of the specication of the success probability in terms of a Tullock contest success function
with discriminatory power 1 that was used in the theoretical analysis. The two stage 1 interactions are
independent from each other, i.e., subjects know that there are two separate urns on stage 1. When
agents made their decision on stage 1, they did not know whom they would encounter on stage 2; they
only knew the types of those players who competed in the other stage 1 interaction. In stage 2, the two
agents who won the stage 1 interaction met. Again, both players could buy a certain number of balls,
which were then placed in a third urn; the player whose ball was randomly drawn received the prize
of 240 Taler. The two players who did not proceed to stage 2 saw a waiting screen until the decision
round was completed. Note that players had to buy and pay for a certain number of balls before they
15With the given parameterization, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies and the discrete grid has no
consequences for the equilibrium strategies.
15knew whether or not they won the prize in a given game. To avoid limited liability problems, each
participant received an endowment of 240 Taler which he could use to buy a certain number of balls on
stage 1; if he reached stage 2, he could use whatever remaines of his endowment to buy balls on stage
2; the part of the endowment which a participant did not use to buy balls was added to the payos
for that round. Since the endowment was as high as the prize which could be won, agents were not
budget-constrained at any time.
The experimental variation is reected in two dierent main treatments: A: SSWW and B: SWSW, with
weak players in treatments A: SSWW and B: SWSW exhibiting low heterogeneity in terms of cW = 1:5.
In additional robustness treatments (high heterogeneity), we increase the degree of heterogeneity by
setting cW = 2:5 to test the predictions about the eect of increased heterogeneity on both performace
measures. Moreover, as Figures 1 and 2 nicely show, the theoretically predicted dierence between
settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW is much higher if cW = 2:5, in particular with respect to incentive
provision. The information participants received about their own cost parameter, the cost parameters
of their co-players, and the structure of the tournament (A: SSWW versus B: SWSW) constitutes the only
dierence across treatments; the wording was identical in all cases.16 We adopted a between-subject
design, such that each participant encountered only one of the four treatments. Each participant
played the same tournament 30 times. Note that the endowment could only be used in a given decision
round, it could not be transferred. Therefore, the strategic interaction was the same in each of the 30
decision rounds. Random matching in each round ensured that the same participants did not interact
repeatedly. After each game, participants were informed about their own decision and about their own
payo. This allows for an investigation whether players learn when completing the task repeatedly.
To avoid income eects, however, the participants were told that only four decision rounds (out of 30)
would be chosen randomly and paid out at the end of the experiment.
The procedures in an experimental session were as follows for all treatments: First, the participants
received some general information about the experimental session. Then, instructions for part one of the
experimental session, the two-stage tournament with four players as described above, were distributed.
After each participant conrmed that he had understood the instructions on the computer screen,
participants were informed about their individual cost parameter. Subsequently, participants had to
answer a set of control questions correctly to ensure that they had fully understood the instructions as
well as the implication of their personal cost parameter. Only then did the rst decision round start.
Only at the end of a session were participants informed about their overall payo in the experiment.
We ran a total of eight computerized sessions with 20 participants each using the software z-Tree
16Detailed information as well as the instructions for tournament participants are available upon request.
16(Fischbacher 2007). In six sessions, we implemented a low degree of heterogeneity between agents, and
an equal number of sessions was conducted for settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW, i.e. three sessions for
each setting. In two additional sessions, we increased the degree of heterogeneity between strong and
weak agents as previously mentioned to test the robustness of our ndings. All 160 participants were
students from the University of Innsbruck, which were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each
session lasted approximately 1.5 hours, and participants earned between 10-20 Euro (approximately 15
Euro on average).
3.2 Results
This section presents experimental evidence to test whether the decisions of the subjects participating
in the experiment are consistent with the predictions of Propositions 1 and 2.
Table 1 presents the theoretical predictions for the parameterization of the experiment and compares
them to the actual behavior of the subjects in the experiment. The upper part of the table presents
results for outcomes in terms of aggregate measures of eort provision. The numbers represent the
average of aggregate eort provision in terms of the measure E across the dierent sessions of the
respective treatment and allow for testing the properties of the tournament regarding incentives as
predicted in Proposition 1. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the baseline parameterization
with low heterogeneity (cW = 1:50) for both settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW. The theoretical predictions
reect the relatively better incentive properties of setting A: SSWW in terms of a predicted total eort
of 152, as compared to 146.32 in setting B: SWSW. However, it should be noted that the dierence is
relatively modest (with predicted eort being a mere 4% higher in setting A: SSWW). Compared to this
theoretical benchmark, we nd substantial overprovision of eort by the subjects in the experiment,
with average total eort levels of above 300 in both settings. The substantial overprovision of more
than 100% compared to the theoretical prediction is consistent with similar ndings in the literature.17
Also in contrast to the theoretical prediction, the experimental results reveal a higher eort exertion
in setting B: SWSW (with 322 compared to 304 in setting A: SSWW), which is potentially due to the high
degree of noise which is common in experimental test of tournament theory.18 It ts into this picture
that the dierence is not statistically signicant (the p-value of a Mann-Whitney u-test of the null that
ESSWW = ESWSW is 0.51).19
17See, for example, Sheremeta (2010) or Sheremeta (2011) who nds a high degree of overprovision in tournaments
with homogeneous agents when using a similar experimental design. According to the study by Bull, Schotter, and
Weigelt (1987), overprovision is also common in tournaments with heterogenenous agents.
18See Sheremeta (2011) for a potential explanation.
19An investigation of the eort provision of the individual subjects of the dierent types on the two stages of the
tournament reveals that these results are mainly driven by the substantial overprovision of eort of players of type W on
17Table 1: Aggregate Incentive Provision and Selection
low het. high het.
A: SSWW B: SWSW A: SSWW B: SWSW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Eort (E) Data 303.751 322.171 275.440 247.480
Theory 152 146.32 133 123.72
Selection (S) Data 0.524 0.706 0.620 0.853
Theory 0.604 0.744 0.710 0.921
Observations 450 450 150 150
Note: Aggregate incentives in terms of the sum of total eort exerted by all
players on all stages (in experimental currency, Taler). Selection refers to the
expected probability of a strong type winning the tournament, conditional
on the eort exertion of all players and the Tullock CSF. See text for details.
The lower part of Table 1 presents the respective results for the selection properties as predicted
in Proposition 2 in terms of the selection measure S. According to the theory, a player of type S is
expected to succeed on stage 2 with probability 0.604 in setting A: SSWW, compared to a probability
of 0.744 in setting B: SWSW. To evaluate this hypothesis empirically, we use the realized outcomes in
terms of the winner of the tournament being of type S as the respective measure.20 The results indicate
that the theoretical prediction is in line with the data, with the empirical probabilities of 0.524 in
setting A: SSWW and 0.706 in setting B: SWSW. This dierence in the winning probability in the two
settings is statistically signicant (the p-value of a Mann-Whitney u-test test is 0.049). Summing up,
we nd a strong and signicant dierence between settings A: SSWW and B: SWSW in terms of selection
performance, but no signicant dierence in terms of incentive provision.
To test whether this nding might be due to the modest dierence in the theoretically predicted
eort across the two settings for this low level of heterogeneity (see Figure 1), we ran additional sessions
where the trade-o between the two tournament designs was more pronounced due to a higher level
of heterogeneity between the two types. In this high heterogeneity scenario, we set cW = 2:50. The
stage 1 in the setting B: SWSW. The respective results are presented in Table B1 in the Appendix. They also show that
overprovision is generally higher for players of type W than of type S, in particular on stage 1 of the tournament. A more
detailed investigation of the reasons for this pattern is beyond the scope of this paper.
20The results are virtually identical when we compute the predicted probability of the tournament winner being of type
S from the experimental data, by using the eort of all players in a given tournament and imputing the corresponding
probability using the linear Tullock contest success function that determined the winning probabilities in the experimental
implementation. Details are available upon request.
18respective results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. In this setting, the theoretical
predictions about total eort are 133 in setting A: SSWW compared to 123.72 in setting B: SWSW, i.e.,
predicted eort is 7.5% higher in setting A: SSWW. Overprovision is still substantial in the experimental
data compared to the theoretical predictions, but the experimental results are consistent with the
prediction of higher eort in setting A: SSWW, with 275 compared to 247 in setting B: SWSW. Also in
terms of selection properties, the dierence between the two settings is more pronounced with higher
heterogeneity. The probability of a player of type S succeeding on stage 2 is 0.62 in setting A: SSWW and
0.853 in setting B: SWSW. As in the scenario with low heterogeneity, the actual probabilities observed
in the experiment closely correspond to this predicted pattern, with 0.71 compared to 0.92 in settings
A: SSWW and B: SWSW, respectively. The scenario with high heterogeneity therefore delivers results that
are fully consistent with the predicted trade-o faced by the tournament designer.
In order to investigate to what extent these results are aected by behavioral dynamics across
experimental rounds, Table 2 presents the results disaggregated by the dierent rounds. A commonly
found pattern in the literature is that subjects in experiments adapt their behavior as the decisions are
repeated, and often converge towards the theoretical benchmark (see, e.g., Bull et al., 1987, Orrison
et al., 2004, or Sherementa, 2010b). The results presented in Table 2 do not support pattern. Rather,
throughout all rounds of the experiment, we nd results that are qualitatively similar to the aggregate
results. We do nd a successive reduction in the extent of eort overprovision over the course of the
experiment, but this reduction does not aect the qualitative results regarding the trade-o between
incentive provision and selection in the dierent tournament designs.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the properties of dierent designs of promotion tournaments with heteroge-
neous participants regarding their incentives for eort provision and their selection performance. The
theoretical analysis has revealed a trade-o for the realistic case of a designer who is interested in both
the incentives for eort provision and the selection performance of a promotion tournament. We nd
that the incentive provision is maximized in a design in which workers of similar strength compete with
each other in early stages of the tournament, while the probability of a strong worker succeeding in
being promoted to the highest level is maximized in the opposite case where workers of dierent types
interact early in the tournament. The trade-o between those two goals is more fundamental, however,
and not restricted to the particular design parameter analyzed in this paper; a tournament designer will
face the same problem when optimizing the prize structure, or deciding about handicapping in a given
19Table 2: Aggregate Incentive Provision and Selection: Dierent Rounds
low het. high het.
Rounds A: SSWW B: SWSW A: SSWW B: SWSW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Eort (E) 1-10 356.40 374.80 290.26 274.42
11-20 293.50 302.56 280.40 240.14
21-30 261.35 289.15 255.66 227.88
Selection (S) 1-10 0.47 0.77 0.58 0.88
11-20 0.54 0.67 0.58 0.84
21-30 0.56 0.69 0.70 0.84
Observations 150 150 50 50
Note: Aggregate incentives in terms of the sum of total eort exerted by all
players on all stages (in experimental currency, Taler). Selection refers to the
expected probability of a strong type winning the tournament, conditional
on the eort exertion of all players and the Tullock CSF. See text for details.
tournament format. A test of these predictions from the theoretical model using experimental methods
has delivered evidence that the behavior under dierent tournament designs is indeed consistent with
the existence of such a trade-o.
The results of this paper have important implications, since they suggest that the dierent mea-
sures that have been suggested in the literature to overcome the detrimental eects of heterogeneity
on incentives, such as handicapping of strong participants, will lead to worse selection properties of
the tournament. Also, the results suggest that heterogeneity is not always associated with worse per-
formance of tournaments, as is suggested by a supercial review of the literature. This paper does
not answer the question, however, whether the trade-o between selection performance and incentives
does also exist across dierent tournament formats. Therefore, it would be an interesting topic for
future research to analyze whether improvements in both dimensions are possible if a designer moves
from a pairwise elimination to other tournament formats like a one-stage tournament or a round robin
tournament.
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A Proofs





W+2cW+5 : Then, the
relation F (cS;cW) > f(cW) does hold for all cW > 1, where F (cS;cW) is dened in (8). Further, if cW = 1,
it holds that F (cS;cW) = f(cW).
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if cW > 1. Further, recall that player 4 has both higher cost (cW > 1) and a lower continuation value
(P2 > P4), such that xB
21 > xB
41 does hold. Therefore, assuming xB
21 = xB







W + 2cW + 5
is the expression we derive from F (cS;cW) under this assumption, we have proven F (cS;cW) > f(cW).
If we assume cW = 1, all players are perfectly symmetric, such that xB
21 = xB
41 does hold. Consequently,
the relation F (cS;cW) = f(cW) does hold for cW = 1.
Lemma 2. We assume cW  cS = 1 without loss of generality and dene flow(cW) = 2cW   1. Then, the
relation f(cW) > flow(cW) does hold for all cW > 1. Further, if cW = 1, it holds that f(cW) = flow(cW).
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W   7cW + 5 > 0
We now have to prove that (cW)  3c3
W  c2
W  7cW +5 > 0 does always hold for cW > 1. Note that (cW)
has a local minimum at cW = 1, and a local maximum at cW =  7=9. Further, (1) = 0. Therefore, it
must be that (cW) > 0 for all cW > 1.
23Proof of Proposition 1:
To prove the relation ESSWW > ESWSW for all cW > cS, we assume without loss of generality that cW > cS = 1.
In the proof, we will proceed in two steps. First, we derive a necessary and sucient condition in terms
of the function F (cS;cW) for the relation ESSWW > ESWSW to hold. Second, we proof that the equilibrium
function F (cS;cW) which was derived in (8) indeed satises this condition. We start with the relation
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W   4cW + 4:
We do only have to consider the second relation, since the rst one is below one for some values of cW,
while F (cS;cW)  1 for all cW  1.21 This completes the rst part of the proof. We now have to prove
that
F
(cS;cW) > Z(cW) 
 c3
W + 2c2
W + cW   2 + R(cW)
2cW + 2
(A1)
for all cW > 1. From Lemmata 1 and 2 we know that F (cS;cW) > flow(cW). Consequently, a sucient
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W + cW   1 > 0
, 2(cW   1)









This relation is always satised if cW > 1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In this proof, we rst derive a necessary and sucient condition which assures that the relation SSSWW <
SSWSW does hold in terms of the function F(cW). Then, we prove that the equilibrium function F (cS;cW)
satises this condition.
(1) As previously, we assume that cW > cS = 1 does hold without loss of generality. Consequently, we
can use the expressions in equations (13) and (14) in what follows. We start with the relation which
21Note that F(1) = 1; also, we know from Lemma 1 that
@F
(cS;cW)
@cW > 0. Therefore, F(cS;cW)  1 for all cW  1.
22Note that squaring is without loss of generality here, since we are only interested in solutions for cW > 1.
24we want to prove:
SSWSW > SSSWW

















Note that it is sucient to show that F (cS;cW) > cW, since cW >
p
cW for cW > 1.
(2) From Lemma 1, we know that F (cS;cW) > f(cW). We will now proof that f(cW) > cW for cW > 1 to
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W   1) > 0
, cW > 1 _  1 < cW < 0
This proves the claim SSWSW > SSSWW for all cW > 1.
25B Additional Tables
Table B1: Individual Eort Provision in Stage 1 and Stage 2
low heterogeneity high heterogeneity
A: SSWW B: SWSW A: SSWW B: SWSW
S W S W S W S W
Eort Stage 1 Data 45.07 28.96 51.39 32.06 71.86 10.77 34.92 10.80
Theory 22 6 14 6 30 2 7 1
Eort Stage 2 Data 83.64 72.05 89.71 55.65 69.09 41.09 92.30 38.39
Theory 58 38 59 39 49 20 56 21
Note: Individual eort provision (in experimental currency, Taler) for strong types S with eort cost
cS = 1:00 and weak types W with eort cost cW = 1:50.
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